



Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogerstt
The subject of this Symposium, The Worker Representation and
Participation Survey ("WRPS") eventually reported on in What Workers
Want,' was motivated by practical policy concerns. In 1993, the
Secretaries of Labor and Commerce in a new Clinton Administration
jointly authorized the formation of a Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations. Chaired by John T. Dunlop, the former Secretary
of Labor under Nixon and Ford and longtime dean of U.S. industrial
relations, the formal charge of the Commission was broad. It was asked to
make recommendations to the Secretaries on: (1) worthy ways (including
"new methods and new institutions") to promote productivity through
"labor-management cooperation and employee participation"; (2) changes
in labor law to "enhance cooperative behavior, improve productivity, and
reduce conflict and delay"; and (3) steps to "increase the extent to which
work-place problems are directly resolved by the parties themselves," with
the aim of reducing the enforcement burden on courts, agencies, and
private litigants.
We thought that this Dunlop Commission-especially with Freeman's
subsequent appointment to it (along with other academic friends, business
leaders known for good labor relations, two former Secretaries of Labor,
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and one former trade union leader, not to remention Dunlop
himself)--offered us a unique opportunity to contribute to the national
discussion about the future of U.S. industrial relations. Our proposed joint
contribution was not another restatement of our own views on the subject,
but the WRPS effort to bring the voice of American workers themselves
into that discussion.3 As we said at the time:
Understanding what employees want is vital to fashioning
effective labor policies in an era when new technologies and
forms of work organization demand change from both workers
and managers, and national labor institutions are themselves
changing. The characteristics of jobs and the demography of the
workforce differ from what they were decades ago when the U.S.
established its labor relations system. Private sector unions are in
decline. Many firms are experimenting with employee
involvement programs. Government regulation of the workplace
has dramatically increased without parallel capacities to monitor
and enforce the new laws. If these sorts of changes motivate a
reconsideration of our national labor policies, they also
underscore the need to hear directly from American workers
[about] how they think the current system is performing.4
In undertaking this effort, we were not entirely naYve. We recognized
that business and labor brought very different agendas to the Dunlop
Commission, guaranteeing that its discussions would be difficult. Unions
wanted the Commission to change labor law to level the playing field
between management and labor in union organizing; business wanted it to
reduce its regulatory costs and liabilities by promoting enforcement
alternatives to courts and agencies, with many firms- particularly in new
industries like information technology- regarding any discussion of
reforming Depression Era labor laws of utter irrelevance to current needs.
At the same time, both business and labor preferred the Commission's
deliberations to be "inside the Beltway," where their control was greatest.
Neither had much interest in blowing that discussion wide open to the
views of American workers, especially as reported by a couple of suspect
academics.
Still, we thought, if anyone could get a constructive discussion going
between American managers and unions it was John Dunlop, who enjoyed
the trust of both principals and a long history of expert labor-management
mediation. And Dunlop was all for our effort, sharing our view that any
3. To be clear here, we speak of what we did jointly. Freeman, of course, participated
throughout in Commission deliberations, and pressed his own views. Rogers also testified
before the Commission at one point, and served on a team of law professors, convened by
Commission counsel Paul Weiler for advice.
4. Freeman & Rogers, Worker Representation and Participation Survey: First Report
of Findings. December 5, 1994, at 2. (On file with the editors).
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intelligent discussion of reform needed better information on what workers
themselves wanted out of it. So it seemed to be worth a try.'
The eventual recommendations of the Commission were stillborn, a
compromise of labor and business interests finally unwelcome by both
sides. Those recommendations were stopped dead with the election of the
104th Congress, and its short-lived "Gingrich Revolution." But in
retrospect, it seems unlikely they would have gotten far, even under
Democratic leadership, had that revolution never occurred. And certainly
they did not figure in President Clinton's subsequent "triangulation"
reelection efforts, or resurface in his second term.
Now, with a Bush Presidency, it is possible that there will be a
renewed push for some version of the TEAM Act that unions so despise
and have previously beaten back-a proposal to excise the law's current
prohibition of employer-dominated "company unions" without offering real
unions anything in return. But it is hard to see how such a one-sided effort
would pass this divided Congress, and TEAM was not in any case what the
Commission had been recommending. All in all then, it's fair to say that
the Commission's deliberations have vanished without a trace.
And what about the voice of the American worker in all of this? It too
was barely heard. The Dunlop Commission took on some of the WRPS
findings, but muffled them in the wrap of its non-starter compromise, and
no major political figure has unwrapped them since. Indeed, the very topic
of modernizing our industrial relations system seems to have receded from
the scene. Despite some promises to labor by the Democratic nominee, it
figured not at all, for example, in the Presidential election just past.
But if the issue of modernizing our industrial relations system is
currently out of political fashion, the need is no less pressing than eight
years ago. And whether the voice of workers is now listened to or not, it is
still out there-and should be listened to if system reform is to be workable
and constructive. Thus, we view this Symposium as dealing with a live and
important set of issues, if not ones in the current political spotlight. And
we appreciate the care with which other Symposium participants have
engaged our work.6
5. It may bear renewed emphasis here, contrary to the impression still held by some,
that the WRPS was not "conducted under the auspices" of the Commission. Bruce E.
Kaufman, The Employee Participation/Representation Gap: An Assessment and Proposed
Solution, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMip. L. 491, 492 (2001). And although Dunlop and some
others on the Commission welcomed the effort, neither did the Commission fund the study
or have any powers over its design.
6. We thank the members of this symposium for their thoughtful comments on What
Workers Want. Special thanks to Professor Summers, from whom over the years we've
learned so much and only grown in respect, for initiating the discussion. He belongs to an
"old" school of research and writing on labor relations-at once normatively demanding,
practically engaged, comparatively informed, and alive to experiment--that sorely needs
2001]
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Their comments, both critical and complimentary, engage two basic
questions about What Workers Want. First, the extent to which the book
got the story on worker demand for voice and power essentially right.
Second, insofar as our findings are correct, what they suggest about what is
to be done.
On the first, the representation/participation gap, we believe that we
did basically get it right, both in its scale and content. We agree with
Matthew Finkin that, "at an irreducible minimum" the book has established
"that a great many American employees feel a need for representation vis-
-vis their employers, that their need is not being filled, and that the reason
for the gap between demand and supply can be attributed to American
management's unwillingness to relinquish authority or to share power."
7
And we disagree with those, here represented best by Professor
Kaufman, who think we have exaggerated worker demand for voice, and
with it the shortfall between present arrangements and what workers
actually desire.8
Where our survey replicates, or is replicated by, others-as in the
question about willingness to vote "union yes" in NLRB representation
elections--there is great consistency between what we and others find.
And if anything, public opinion since our survey shows increased support
for greater worker voice. For instance, the Peter Hart Research polls
conducted for the AFL-CIO over the past several years9 report a drop in
negative attitudes toward unions over the 1993-99 period from 34% to 23%
and a corresponding increase in those positive or neutral about unions from
66% to 77%. Most telling, the Hart Research polls find that the share of
non-union members who would vote union if given a choice tomorrow has
gone up (from 39% to 43%), and that a majority of young workers aged 18-
renewal.
7. Matthew W. Finkin, Bridging the Representation Gap, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
391, 392 (2001).
8. Some of Kaufman's critique is simply mistaken. One of his strongest points for our
exaggeration of the representation gap, for example, rests on a simple misreading of Table
3.4, which mapped the degree of satisfaction workers had with their influence against their
attitudes toward other aspects of their job. We found that workers reporting high
satisfaction with their influence tended to look forward to work more, rate industrial
relations there more highly, trust management more, etc. than those less satisfied with their
influence. Some eighty-five percent of those very satisfied with their level of say, for
example, report usually looking forward to going to work, as contrasted with the fifty-nine
percent of those not satisfied with their influence, who wish they did not have to go.
Kaufman reads the table in reverse, interpreting us to say that eighty-five percent of those
who look forward to going to work, themselves about two-thirds of our respondents, are
very satisfied with their influence, and finds this, not surprisingly, a far bigger share than we
elsewhere report. Kaufman, supra note 5, at 497.
9. These are summarized on the AFL-CIO's website. Peter D. Hart Research
Associates Inc., Americans' Attitudes Towards Unions, AFL-CIO, at http://www.aflcio.org/
labor99/amattitude.htm.
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34 have especially positive attitudes and would likely vote pro-union in a
hypothetical election.
Nor has the late 1990s economic expansion diminished worker
skepticism about management's concern for their interests, negating the
need for representation or participation. Replicating the WRPS, a late 2000
Business Week poll showed most workers giving business high marks for
basic competence, but quite low ones in how they treat their employees.
Only 6% of respondents thought business did an "excellent" job in
"treating all of their employees well," for example, as against 63% who
thought their performance at that was "only fair" or "poor." Comparable
figures were reported on management performance in "providing job
security for employees"--7% "excellent"; 65% "only fair" or
"poor"--even at this time of record low unemployment. And, more
generally, the public remains firmly committed to the view that corporate
governance and behavior should reflect broader "stakeholder" interests
than those of shareholders. Only 4%, for example, agree that profits and
shareholder return should be the only goal of business; some 95% thought
profits should sometimes be sacrificed for the well-being of employees or
their communities.'0 Similarly, recent polls on job satisfaction support the
basic story we told. In fact, the latest from the Conference Board, which
surveys regularly on the subject, finds employee job satisfaction down
substantially from the mid-1990s levels recorded around the time of our
survey-among the 45-54 year olds, down 57% to 47% percent over 1995-
2000; among 35-44 year olds, down 61% to 51% percent.1
All of these results, among others, support the basic contentions of
Work Workers Want that relate to the magnitude of worker demand for
more voice in workplace decision-making.
We are equally untroubled by ambiguities in the respective and
overlapping roles of "cooperation," "power," and "voice" in that decision-
making. These are noted by virtually all the commentators, and of special
concern to Professor Bronfenbrenner in her critical remarks.'
10. Americans Have a Beef With Big Business, Bus. WK., Aug. 31, 2000, at
www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/aug2000/ nf2000083 1_923.htm.
11. Survey Shows Growing Job Malaise Despite Boom Times in U.S. Labor Market,
BNA EMP. POL'Y & L. DAILY, Oct. 17,2000.
12. See Kate Bronfenbrenner, What Do Workers Want: Reflections on the Implications
of the Freeman and Rogers Study, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 385, 385 (2001). About our
pursuit of worker tradeoffs between power and management cooperation, Bronfenbrenner
seems particularly upset that we did not ask workers about their feelings toward strong
worker organizations enjoying cooperative relations with management, and weak ones
suffering management hostility. We did not because we thought the "most preferred" and
"least preferred" status of these conditions to be obvious, with further confirmation of that
simply a waste of time. The question we wanted to get at was the more difficult tradeoff
one, which we also took to be equivalent to a question about whether management attitude,
or organizational form, dominated the outcome of worker attitude.
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Bronfenbrenner is concerned that we understand worker demand for power,
not cooperation. But the fact that even the most ardent union members
answered our cooperation questions about the same as the general
population gives us confidence that their answers really are a general view,
and not an artifact of a misguided question design. 3 Reciprocally, that
workers favoring "cooperative" relations in WRPS Wave 1 made clear in
Wave 2 that cooperation entails some real effect on management decisions
also reassures us. The term "cooperation" has meaning, and it does not
denote "lying down." Workers want more power in their relations with
management, and they want those relations to be more cooperative. Even
recognizing the need-especially given management's dominion-for
tradeoffs between these interests, this view is hardly incoherent. Indeed, it
is what most people want in one-sided relationships that matter to them.
To be sure, there are things that we would do differently were we to
start the WRPS today. Some questions would go, others would be added,
and there would be alterations in the wording. But these sorts of changes
are themselves clarified by the hindsight of what we have learned from the
WRPS-par for the course in any research enterprise-and we doubt that
they would alter its basic findings. In the meantime, small disagreements
of degree about their scale and content-about whether our estimate of the
percentage of workers really wanting "strongly independent" organizations
is a bit high, or the percentage really wanting traditional unions a bit
low-do not concern us greatly, since the broad brush strokes of this
picture are just that. Better than 90% of private sector American
workers-well over 100 million adults-have no workplace organization
of any kind to talk collectively with employers, and very little protection if
they sought one. Almost all say that they want both. The sheer magnitude
of that unmet desire is what seems to us most important to keep in view.
Which brings us to the second question-what is to be done? There
are many suggestions in the Symposium, and elsewhere, about how we
might improve American industrial relations. All operate in some
prescriptive policy space whose three dimensions are set by varying
normative goals, assessments of what we know or think we know works
best to achieve them, and estimates of the likely political support for either.
Possible locations within this space are almost limitless in number; in any
case, they vastly exceed our capacities for canvass here. We offer, then,
just a few points--themselves midway between design desiderative and
practical learning-to locate our own thoughts about what is practically
desirable. Our affinities with or distance from alternative suggestions
should be evident in their statement.
13. This view was also indirectly confirmed by the like response of public sector
workers and Canadian and other foreign workers.
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Free Experiment: We take the most fundamental failing of present
policy on worker representation to be its two-fold denial of voice, and of its
appropriate form. Dejure, our depression era labor laws offer workers and
firms a very limited range of choice on worker representation in firm
governance--a "0 or 1" choice between nothing and union collective
bargaining. De facto, they offer even less, since they provide little to no
curb to managerial resistance to unions, and resistance is pervasive. 14 Both
things need to change. We should secure some hard floor on basic
organizing rights, and permit, and indeed actively encourage, diversity in
how they are organized. Among those in this symposium, Professor Hunter
is at greatest pains to emphasize the importance of recognizing the variety
of employment circumstances and attendant employee needs and wants.
We share the point, perhaps even its critical application to our own
analysis.'5 And while Professor Kaufman is right to bemoan the fact that
we lack good data on the costs and benefits of different sorts of worker
organization, 16 we think there no practical way to find those out absent
some real-world experiment, which only makes it more important that
experiment be permitted to begin.
This is not a foreign idea. The heart of our free enterprise system is to
allow firms and workers to try (and often fail) different products and modes
of production, and our Constitution reserves similar experimental powers to
the states. (In this symposium, Professor Finkin offers some useful
thoughts on how that might be encouraged in labor relations; these should
be extended.17 ) This spirit of trying new things and reinventing old ones
should be unleashed on our presently petrified system of labor relations.
Let's see what new forms of labor and management organization free
citizens can come up with, and let the most effective and generally
14. Kenneth McLennan finds that management resistance to unions is "simply not
credible" as a "major" explanation of their decline. Kenneth McLennan, Worker
Representation and Participation in Business Decisions Through Employee Involvement
Programs, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 563, 586 (2001). But given the many studies on this
subject, and the sorts of facts reviewed here by Andrew Levin, we frankly find this view
itself less than credible. Andrew S. Levin, What Thirty Million Workers Want-But Can't
Have, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 551 (2001). Of course there are many sources of unions'
present weakness-technological changes, changes in industrial structure, even wounds
long self-inflicted. But growing employer hostility, and the law's lack of worker defense
against it, certainly must figure centrally in the explanation of their present circumstance,
and even their past difficulty in responding better to broad changes in the economy.
15. Larry W. Hunter, Considering What Workers Want, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 421
(2001). The growth of "non-standard employment" relations is emphasized as well in the
recent MIT project on changing labor market institutions, which finds it probably the single
most important challenge facing our current industrial relations system. See generally Paul
Osterman et al., The Task Force on Reconstructing America's Labor Market Institutions
(August 2000) (on file with editors).
16. Kaufman, supra note 5.
17. Finkin, supra note 7.
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satisfying ones win.18
Worker Stakeholders: Effective twenty-first century U.S. industrial
relations require breaking with our nineteenth century rules on corporate
governance-which assign workers no real role in determining firm
organization and strategy, and generally accord them no residual claim on
the firm's surplus. We quite agree with Jacoby 9 that corporate governance
is the "missing link" in most discussions of worker representation, and one
that is vital to attend and improve. The growth of employee owned
businesses, the extension of stock options and other forms of shared
capitalist compensation to workers, and the increased ownership stake of
workers through their pension funds all provide a natural material base for
such an effort. Their power should be harnessed to devise governance
forms more in keeping with our broader goals for worker
representation-beginning with more widespread encouragement of
employee ownership, greater rights of control for employee owners
(including, minimally, more control over the disposition of their present
assets), and much better access, for worker-owners, to "inside" firm
information.
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Social Wage: While there is much
that impresses about the potential for decentralized bargaining and
consultation--not least its ability to elicit otherwise impacted information
for efficiency gains, and to add monitoring and enforcement capacities to
public authority in securing workplace standards-it seems far less
recommended for such basics as wages and social protections (health
insurance, vacation time, family leave, etc.). We favor greater uniformity
and higher levels of basic wages and social insurance, which in turn implies
a greater governmental role in this area, and breaking with the New Deal
system's institutional orthodoxy on bargaining and organization, viz. that
their site and level needed to be the same.
Productive Solidarity: While the Dunlop Commission made much of
the efficiency and productivity contributions that better worker
organization can make, the U.S. does little explicitly to encourage the
development or harnessing of that contribution, or to reward it when made.
This too should change, beginning with technical and other support to
worker organizations that are intent on making such contribution, and their
award of greater powers to participate in workforce development,
modernization, and other economic development systems. The
18. Of course, just how they would be judged to "win," and the mechanisms for sorting
"winners" from "losers," are important continuing issues of debate. We are not unaware of
these, but here simply wish to press the importance of opening up that debate and the
underlying experimentation with different forms.
19. Sanford M. Jacoby, Employee Representation and Corporate Governance: A
Missing Link, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 449, 450 (2001).
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development of this role for worker organizations is one way both to
domesticate conflicts with business, and secure their help in stewardship of
the economy. Worker groups have, for example, the clearest stake in
promoting "high road" economic restructuring in the U.S.--something that
many parts of the business community desire, but will not and cannot do on
their own. At the same time, worker groups, unions, and other forms of
employee groupings are natural providers of a range of services to workers
not now enjoying the benefits of organization-legal assistance, advice on
career and financial management, access to training services, and the like.
Contrary to some of our critics, then, we do not think that an imported
German works councils system or a system that simply lowers the costs of
unionization fits the bill for U.S. labor relations in the twenty-first century.
What we do think is that a modem labor relations system should give
workers greater baseline protections, both procedural and substantive, in
dealings with employers, as well as greater property rights in the firm. And
we believe that worker organizations, no less than those of business, should
be encouraged to take an explicit social role, including new forms of
servicing their members, in the stewardship of the economy.
In composite, this seems to us an attractive package, and one resonant
with deeply held American values and current economic and social need. It
would give American capitalism a more human face, and workers and their
organizations greater respect and a more disciplined social role. At the
same time, it would almost certainly be good for the productivity of
American business, the efficiency of public regulation, and the equity of
our distribution of the benefits of social cooperation. Nor need one strain
between the lines of What Workers Want to see that the effort to strike such
a new deal at work would command enormous popular support. The
people seem ready for it. It is principally their leaders who lag behind.
As these last comments indicate, what is sad is that U.S. public policy
toward labor has been almost impervious to the voice of American
workers. They, like others, want freedom and choice at the workplace. But
in the dysfunctional and imprisoning ruins of our New Deal industrial
relations system, the U.S. offers a more limited institutional menu, and
gives management a greater role in choosing among the menu items, than
any other society that calls itself democratic. Our labor laws are the least
enabling of worker organization, and our political system is the least
supportive for individual workers to resolve disputes with their employer,
save the few who manage to go to court and sue that employer. Indeed, we
now lack even public discussion of how worker interests might be better
organized and heard.20 For the quality of our public life together, it is hard
20. No other country has gone as long as we without some fundamental reform of its
industrial relations system; in most, the discussion of industrial relations trends and what
they imply for the state is almost an ongoing topic of political debate.
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to imagine anything more important than the rules on the governance of
work, and yet in our actual government we hear almost nothing about them.
Issues of vastly less importance routinely grab the attention of politicians
on both sides of the aisle. Yet even the most thoughtful and constructive
suggestions for improving the organization of our working lives, including
some represented here, are birthed with the inimitable smell of things
already close to death.
We leave it to readers to judge whether Wat Workers Want is what
Bruce Kaufman calls "one of the 'big books' of modem industrial
relations."2' In length it certainly is not-only 150 or so pages of text, and
even those crowded with lots of tables and figures. But what is big, in our
view, are the main findings of the book--that workers have well-formed
views of how their workplace operates and how it can be improved; that
they can make sensible considered judgments of potential changes in labor
laws and institutions;22 and that they overwhelmingly want something
better than what the U.S. currently offers them.
We are confident that, eventually, these views of American workers
will be heard. But for them to have political weight they need be listened
to, and found agreement with them needs to be voiced by others---elected
representatives, groups outside of labor, concerned citizens generally. As a
society, we need to recognize that employee freedom at the workplace and
a government responsive to its exercise, are not "special interests." They
are the daily guarantees of a democracy. Not listening to what workers
want guarantees us less of a democracy than we can have, and that all of us
should want.
21. Kaufman, supra note 5, at 491.
22. We think this despite common worker confusion about the protections of current
law. See here our discussion in Chapters 6 and 7.
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